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Foreign Direct Investment in Eastern Europe:
Applying Traditional Models of FDI to the Transitional Countries of Eastern Europe
J. Austin Kerr
Abstract
An empirical analysis is used to detennine whether the factors that normally explain FDI flows to
developing countries are also suitable to explain FDI flows to the developing countries of Eastern
Europe for the years 1988-1992. It was found that a typical set of explanatory variables which
explain FDI flows to non Eastern Europe developing countries very well, is not a useful set of
detenninants for FDI flows to Eastern Europe. Conclusions are drawn concerning the extent to
which these results reflect the current state of political and economic transition taking place in
Eastern Europe.

Outline
The paper is divided into nine sections. Section I briefly states the goal of
the research at hand. Section II provides background information regarding the recent
trends of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to developing countries, including the
developing countries of Eastern Europe. Section ill reviews the many benefits FDI
inflows bring to developing countries. Section IV explains how FDI inflows to Eastern
Europe can aid the region in its transition to a market economy. Section V presents the
current situation in Eastern Europe and discusses the region as a potential location for
foreign investment. Section VI builds the model that is used to examine determinants of
FDI flows via a survey of the literature. Section VII reviews possibly relevant explanatory
variables not included in the model and comments on the effects of their absence. Section
Vill consists of the data analysis, applying the model constructed in Section VI to
developing countries located both in and outside of Eastern Europe. Section IX states the
conclusions of the empirical analysis and discusses its implications, as well as suggestions
for future research.
For a quick read of the paper, read only sections I, II, VI, VIII and IV
which capture the goal, methods, results, and conclusions of the study. Reading sections
ill, IV, V and VII, however, will provide a better understanding of the study's approach
and will give more depth to its significance.

I. Objective
The motive of this paper is to examine whether the factors that normally
determine FDI flows to developing countries are suitable to explain FDI flows to the
developing countries of Eastern Europe. Understanding whether and how the
determinants of FDI in Eastern Europe is different from other developing countries will
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assist Eastern European countries in the implementation of policies that create an
atmosphere which is more attractive to foreign investors.

II. Recent Trends in FDI Flows to Developin2 Countries
In the 1970s and the 1980s FDI played a very important role as an engine
for growth in developing countries. 1 Global FDI flows have been growing rapidly,
increasing from $47 billion in 1985 to $139 billion in 1988. 2 In 1990 global FDI outflows
reached $225 billion - with an outward stock of $1.7 trillion - opening a new decade of
enormous global capital flows. 3 In the meantime,·the share of private investment in
aggregate net resource flows to these countries increased form just 6% in 1980 to 49% in
19934- mainly due to limited access to other sources of financing. 5 Clearly, private
investment has become one of the most important sources of finance for developing
countries. Global FDI inflows to developing countries are expected to reach $400 billion
(in 1990 prices) by the year 2020, increasing their present share of global FDI flows to
50%.6
The emergence of the countries of Eastern Europe as host countries to FDI
- indicated by the two tables below ~ is also among the most significant trends in global
FDI flows. 7
Table A.
Growth of Foreign Investment Registrations in the CMEA Countries
{number of reI!, istrations)
country
Jan. 1, 1988 Jan. 1, 1989 Jan. 1, 1990 Oct. 1; 1990
Bulgaria
70
15
25
30
Czechoslovakia
500
7
16
60
Hungary
1,000
2,300
102
270
Poland
1,950
13
55
918
Romania
570
5
5
5
Former USSR
23
191
1,274
2,051
Total
165
562
3,287
7,441
Source: ECE database on joint ventures, attained from Hamilton & Adjubei (1991:76)
*Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic in 1991.

lArgawal, Gubitz, Nunnenkamp, 1991:126; Welfens, 1994a:137; Welfens, 1994b:155.
2IMF Balance of Payments Statistics, 1995.
3UNCTC, 1992 in Welfens, 1994a:139.
4Tbe World Bank, 1994 in Sader, 1995:1.
5World real interest rates have increased since the early 1980s and are expected to rise still higher
throughout the 1990s. Fry, 1994; Lizondo, 1991:68.
6U.N. World Investment Report, 1993:105.
7UNIDO, 1990:viii.
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Table B.
Real per capita FDI of Developing Countries in Eastern Europe and Non Eastern
rea
oars per person)*
Europe (11990dll
1988
Non Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe

8.553
0.325

1989
9.884
4.827

1990

1991

10.066

12.148

8.157

9.942

1992
12.692
16.508

*The countries used to compute these values are those used in the sample regressions later on.

It is clear from Table A that the number of foreign investment registrations

in Eastern Europe has accelerated from nearly zero to significantly large amounts. Table
B confirms that the overall size of the FDI flows to Eastern Europe has also increased
considerably. In fact, Table B shows that FDI flows to Eastern Europe were initially
lower than comparable levels in other developing regions but increased at a faster rate to
reach levels greater than the rest of the developing world.
ITI. Benefits of Forei~n Direct Investment to Host Countries
Developing Countries are now well aware of the many advantages and
benefits of FDI. 8 As a form of import substitution, 9 FDI enhances export earnings,
relieves foreign exchange shortages lO and improves future tax receipts ll - which, over the
long run, improve the host country's balance of trade and balance of payments accounts.12
Foreign investors are more able to export than indigenous enterprises because of their
international connections.13 In fact, several surveys indicate a positive correlation between
FDI inflows and the export performance of host countries. 14
In many respects the efficiency improvements brought by FDI are more
important than the actual increase in capital stock. 15 In addition to new capital, foreign
investors bring the managerial expertise and technological modernization necessary to
surviving a competitive global market. 16 FDI can increase competition in the host country
as well as the country's competitiveness in the global market, in part, because it supplies
8Argawal, Gubitz & Nunnenkamp, 1991:126.
9Dobosiewicz, 1992:32; Michalak, 1992:1573; UNIDO, 1990:viii.
lOpry, 1994.
11 Welfens , 1994b:164.
12Ibid,50.
13Dobosiewicz, 1992:32; Michalak, 1992: 1587.
14Inotao, 1991:99; Welfens, 1994a:141.
15Steinherr, 1993:216.
16Cebula & Schultz, 1993; Darnrau, 1992:36; Hamilton & Adjubei, 1991:75; Hunya, 1992:501; Levcik,
1991:15; Lizondo, 1991 :76; Michalak, 1992:1582; Sader, 1995:13; Sarcinelli, 1992:17; Schire, 1990;
UNIDO, 1990:viii,ix; Welfens, 1994b:146.

4

higher quality products. 17 The technology transfer brought by foreign investors reduces
the entrepreneurial gap between nations, encourages product innovation 18 and even
reduces environmental pollution 19 which, overall, stimulates increased productivity.20
FDI also has a direct linkage effect on domestic investment by firms of the
host country.21 For example, the establishment of an automobile plant by a foreign
investor might induce investment in the domestic tire and petrochemical industries. 22 The
increase in output or expenditure sparked by FDI could produce an accelerator effect on
domestic investment as well as employment. 23 In tum, FDI stimulates economic growth
and development24 as it did for OEeD countries in the 1980s. 25 Some researchers have
even approximated that a percentage point increase in FDIIGDP would increase economic
growth by more than one percentage point. 26 Others, however, have argued that there is
no historical evidence of sustained growth predominantly financed by foreign capital
anywhere.27
FDI can become important not only for production, exports and
employment, but also as a catalyst for political change - both in the host and parent
countries. 28 It is commonly believed that FDI and expected future protectionism are
linked; that one country investing in another avoids trade friction and, thus, diffuses
protectionist sentiment because exports are replaced by local production. 293o
The past three decades have provided an enormous set of empirical
research that attempts to explain why some developing countries attract more FDI than
others. 31 The recent increase of FDI flows has not been sufficient enough to overcome the
drastic decline of other types of private capital transfers, particularly bank loans to
developing countries. 32 In the prevailing environment of reduced official aid flows and
17Dobosiewicz, 1992:33,36; Hamilton & Adjubei, 1991:75.
18Welfens, 1994a:129,133.
19Hamilton & Adjubei, 1991:75.
2~aldwin & Venables, 1994:298; Dobosiewicz, 1992:36; Hamilton & Adjubei, 1991:74.
21Saltz, 1992.
22Wai & Wong, 1982:21.
23Welfens, 1994b:48; UNIDO, 1990:vii.
24Wai & Wong, 1982:20.
25Welfens, 1994b:49.
26Ibid, 139.
27Steinherr, 1993:205.
28Michalak, 1992:1573; Welfens, 1994b:50.
29Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz, 1994.
30Dobosiewicz (1992:25) believes that foreign investment provides political security, because "having a
foreigner with his [or her] factory in the host country is like having a division of troops." While this is a
melodramatic way of stating his point, the point is well taken.
31Podkakminer, 1996.
320ECD, 1989:2243.
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mounting debt burdens, FDI perhaps represents the most important source of technology
and capital. 33
On the FDI-receiving side, changes in government policies of developing
countries towards FDI have confirmed and strengthened an apparent trend towards
liberalization of regulation on FDI inflows since the early 1980s. 34 Developing countries
now seek primarily to encourage inward FDI by reducing obstacles, restrictions and
requirements, and by offering guarantees and incentives as essential elements of new,
liberal investment codes. While this trend constitutes an initial necessary condition for the
inflow of FDI, it is by no means a sufficient condition. It may be safely concluded,
therefore, that policy reforms on FDI by themselves are unlikely to have much impact on
FDI inflows to developing countries. Any noticeable impact must result from a
combination of appropriate policies with broader economic, technological and strategic
considerations. Because FDI is not evenly dispersed among developing countries,35 it is
both possible36 and necessary to examine the degree to which various factors determine
FDI.

IV. The Need for FDI in Eastern Europe
Like all developing countries, the ability to attract significant amounts of
FDI is widely understood as paramount to how quickly a country in Eastern Europe can
grow in a sustainable manner. In Eastern Europe FDI is regarded as one of the main
mechanisms that can help stabilize the volatile process of economic transition and the
associated political process.J7 In order to transform into a market economy the postcommunist countries must overcome their tendency for autarky and integrate themselves
into the world economy. 38
Before this decade the socialist countries of Eastern Europe were not at all
significant target host countries of FDI. It was only after 1985 when the isolationist
policies of the communist regimes relaxed that possibilities for joint ventures increased
considerably in Eastern Europe. 39
The radical reversal of the established anti-foreign policies toward FDI can
be seen in the rapid increase in the number of foreign investment registrations in the region
33Balasubramanyam, 1984:721-2.
34Fry, 1994; UNIDO, 1990:x.
35Tsru, 1994.
_
36Econometrically speaking, there is enough variance among FDI flows to developing countries to allow
for the examination of various possible determinants.
Levcik, 1991:16; Michalak, 1992:1576.37
38Levcik, 1991:21.
39Gabrisch, 1993:20; Michalak, 1992:1576.
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represented by the table below. 4o Though the monetary values of each registered
investment are small by international standards,41 the unfolding of the privatization
processes will certainly create significant opportunities for foreign investors. 42
There is little doubt that foreign capital will playa significant role in the
region. 43 "According a vice president at the World Bank, the new democracies of Eastern
Europe will need at least $20 billion in capital inflow every year for the next decade if they
are to make real progress. "44 The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
estimates that Hungary, Czech, Slovakia and Poland alone will need $2 trillion over the
next 10 years. 45 The institute for International Economics claims that $1.5 trillion is
needed per year to raise the amount of productive capital per employee in Eastern Europe
to Western levels within ten years. 46
While these estimates seem extremely high, Eastern European governments
generally agree that foreign capital would benefit their economies greatly and hope that
FDI inflows continue to accelerate and significantly ease the process of transition from
state monopolies to a truly market-oriented economy.47 Some countries have even
established foreign investment agencies to create the best conditions for attracting FDI.48
For Eastern Europe in particular, FDI can act as a spur to the privatization
process49 - the progress of which is crucial to a successful transition toward a capitalist
economy. 50 Further privatization brings further competition and eventually static
efficiency so that producers can adjust output to the marginal-product rule. 51 FDI is
needed for privatization to occur more rapidly because the existing capital and savings
stock in the Eastern European countries is not sufficiently large to privatize the stateowned assets.52
From a political-economic point of view, the fall in real income, the rise of
uncertainty and the fear of unemployment have to be counterbalanced by credible
prospects for high future economic growth. The shortage of capital and entrepreneurship
40Gabrisch, 1993:20; Hamilton & Adjubei, 1991:76; Michalak, 1992:1579; Sarcinelli, 1992:14.
41Harnilton & Adjubei, 1991:78,90; Hunya, 1992:507.
42Michalak, 1992:1574.
43Fink, 1993:9; Michalak, 1992:1574; Welfens, 1994b:50.
44Vice President Willy Wapenhans. Sarcinelli, 1992:13
45UNECE, 1991.
46Sarcinelli, 1992: 13.
47Gabrisch, 1993:31; Michalak, 1992:1576,1586.
48Harnilton & Adjubei, 1991:74.
49Dobosiewicz, 1992:118; Hunya, 1992:503; Levcik, 1991:25.
50Darnrau, 1992:34; Hamilton & Adjubei, 1991:74; Lange, 1993:162; Michalak, 1992:1577; Welfens,
1994a:130; Welfens, 1994b:161.
51Sader, 1995:13; Welfens, 1994a:133.
52Michalak,1992:1577.
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in the formerly socialist countries of Eastern Europe necessitates that these countries use
foreign capital as a major alternative source offinance. 53 FDI is seen in Eastern Europe as
one of the main macroeconomic mechanisms that will help stabilize the volatile process of
economic transition as well as the associated political process. 54
Because foreign investment flows to Eastern Europe have not neared the
high needs estimated, developing a model which tries to explain the determinants of FDI
will benefit Eastern European countries in their quest to attain more foreign capital.
Before examining how a model that explains FDI to other developing countries might also
apply to countries in Eastern Europe, it is useful to have a good understanding of the
current investment situation in Eastern Europe.

v. The Outlook for Foreia=n Investment in Eastern Europe
On the one hand, the first stages of the transition to a market economy has
created many new opportunities for investments, but on the other, an investment is the
result of a decision oriented toward the future and is hence extremely sensitive to changes
in background conditions which create additional uncertainties and can cause investors to
hesitate. There are risks related to the political situation, to the legal framework, to the
macroeconomic conditions, to the prospective market development, to financing and to
management and employment. 55 But there is also potential for high rates of return.
Eastern Europe is still in an inevitable recession,56 which makes it more
difficult for all firms to realize the originally expected profits and turnovers.57 Increasing
inflation makes inputs for each enterprise activity more expensive. 58 Unemployment is
extremely high,59 and not well understood by people who are accustomed to having "the
right to work." Consumption and real income are still far below their initial levels. 60
The region's infrastructure needs many improvements. 61 Insufficient
telephone and communication systems, insufficient railroad and road transport systems
limit investors' access to consumers and input materials and make international contacts
very difficult. 62 Telephone and computer ownership in Eastern European countries is a
53Michalak:, 1992:1574; Welfens, 1994a:141.
54Michalak:, 1992: 1576.
55Fink,1993:11.
56Gabrisch, 1993:46.
57Ibid,27.
58Fink, 1993:13; Levcik, 1991:15.
59Fink, 1993:9.
6fiw
•
vLevclk,
1991:21.
61Welfens, 1994b:54.
62Fink, 1993:13; Lang & Dfek, 1993:6.
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fraction of the levels in the West. 63 Many communications systems, however, are in the
process of modernization. 64
The commercial banking system is not yet viable65 which deters foreign
investors who seek domestic credit. 66 Enterprise debtors often fail to make scheduled
payments of principal and interest to creditors. 67 Both the risk ratings and foreign
indebtedness for Eastern Europe are generally very high and have risen for most
countries. 68 The absence of a formalized accounting system that provides reliable and
consistent information is also detrimental to potential investors. 69
The legal systems in Eastern Europe are still transforming and, thus, in a
very ambiguous state'?o Enforcement of contracts is unavailable in some cases'?! The
flood of both new laws and domestic and foreign applicants seeking to invest has
overburdened the state administration, so that licensing and registration procedures take
even longer than before,?2 It can be extremely difficult to get a license for imports of
essential inputs for specific production73 - though foreign trade has undergone tremendous
liberalization,?4 Uncertainty and confusion still exist among potential foreign investors
about exactly what modes of acquisition are permissible and exactly how privatization in
each country is to proceed,?5 Gabrisch (1993:25) describes the state of the legal systems
as a "legal no-man's lands" that might even be seen as having many opportunities for quick
profits because of the uncertain market situation and weak legal system.
Property questions remain unresolved,?6 Even though most Eastern
European countries now allow 100% foreign ownership and provide legal guarantees
concerning foreign property 77 foreign investors often do not know whether the partner
who leases or sells the land or property to them is actually the owner,?8

63Hamilton & Adjubei, 1991:89.
64Ibid,90.
65Gabrisch, 1993:29; Lang & Ofek, 1993:6.
66Damrau, 1992:41.
67Begg & Portes, 1993:396.
68Gabrisch, 1993:30.
69Lang & Ofek, 1993:5.
70Schmid, 1992:707.
71Ibid.,709.
72Gabrisch, 1993:29.
73Fink,1993:13.
74Levcik,1991:15.
75Damrau, 1992:43; Gabrisch, 1993:46.
76Froot, 1994:317.
77Hunya, 1992:503.
78Gabrisch, 1993:31.
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Since the newly created political and economic institutions will initially
enjoy only weak credibility and government authority has been weakened by the collapse
of communism the people of Eastern Europe tend to easily distrust capitalism and
capitalist foreign investors.?9 The move to a dominant private-business sector economy
will bring greater income inequality.8o Participation by foreign investors in privatization
programs therefore has the potential to be politically sensitive, especially if unemployment
remains high.81 Eastern Europe cannot expect foreign investors to be eager to invest
without political stability. 82
Corporate management abilities in Eastern Europe are inferior by Western
standards. 83 Decades of living under communism have diffused any sense of
entrepreneurial spirit. 84 There is a shortage of capable and motivated managers who are
also proficient in relevant foreign languages. 85
Yet there are reasons foreign investors should consider locating their
investment projects in Eastern Europe over other developing regions. The market
structure in Eastern European countries suggests considerable economic advantages for
newcomers as opposed to state firms.86 The firm structure is dominated by large state
firms and is thus sub-optimal, which do not operate very efficiently. Also, many Eastern
European countries have become more disciplined with their budgets. 87 Given the
increasing global outflows of foreign capital there is considerable potential of high returns
to be tapped in the transforming countries of Eastern Europe. 88
A number of researchers believe that Eastern Europe has talented but
inexpensive labor.89 The data in Table C on the next page supports both of these claims.

79Welfens, 1994a:132.
8Owelfens, 1994b:163.
81 Sader, 1995:13.
82Fink, 1993:10; Levcik, 1991:8; Welfens, 1994b:54.
83Welfens, 1994b:165.
84Damrau, 1992:34; Sarcinelli, 1992:9.
85Gabrisch, 1993:28; Lang & Dfek, 1993:7.
86Gabrisch, 1993:25.
87Levcik,1991:15.
88Welfens, 1994b:51.
89Damrau, 1992:39; Rollo, 1990:107; Lang and Dfek, 1993: 1.
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Table C.
Labor Statistics for Eastern Europe and Other Developing Countries. *
Average real monthly wage (1990 US dollars)
Average percentage of population having passed secondary
education
Average amount of GOP produced per worker (1990 US dollars)

Eastern
Non Eastern
Europe
Europe
$189.66
$194.66
70.90%

45.00%

$4,615

$3,954

*The numbers listed are cross-country averages over 1987 to 1991.

Table C shows that, while wage levels in Eastern Europe are only slightly
lower than wage levels in other developing countries, the skill level of the labor force
(proxied by the secondary enrollment level) in Eastern Europe is much higher. The
productivity of the labor force in Eastern Europe (represented by the bottom row of the
table) appears to be greater as well.
Fink (1993: 13) warns, however, that workers employed in foreign-owned
enterprises often demand higher wages and the threat of an increasing wage-productivity
gap worries potential investors. 9o Dobosiewicz (1992:28) believes that the better
organization schemes already implemented by foreign investors has led to rapid increases
in labor productivity which, in turn, have ensured higher rates of return. 91 It may take
some time for many workers to adapt to the new procedures and technologies used by
competitive frrrns.92
In summary, Eastern Europe is like other developing regions in that it

presents both additional risks as well as some extra significant potential to foreign
investors. An empirical analysis will provide insight as to the extent each of the factors
discussed above actually affect FDI inflows.

VII. Buildine a model to explain FDI flows
This section reviews the many possible factors that are thought to help
determine FDI inflows to developing countries. The decision of whether each particular
variable is included in the model is based on the discussions and results from past studies
and the availability of reliable data. The development of the model used to explain FDI
flows is derived from a survey of past research literature, which is simultaneously
reviewed.

90Darnrau, 1992:39.
91Lang & Ofek, 1993:4.
92Dobosiewicz, 1992:28; Gabrisch, 1993:28.
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There is no single theory that fully explains FDI flOWS. 93 Instead, there are
a number of structural variables that are typically assumed to determine a fIrm's decision to
engage in an investment project in a developing country. It must be kept in mind that
although individual investment decisions belong to microecnomic theory, almost all of the
explanatory variables in the model are derived form aggregate data.
Every explanatory variable that is used in the model is lagged by one year,
which is assumed to be the average length of time between the point when foreign
investors decide to invest and the actual point in time when the engagement of the
investment activity occurs.94
The rational explaining how each variable is included is explained below:

Domestic market size: Population and Per Capita Real GDP
The most mentioned determinant of FDI is the size of the market in a
country.95 In a survey asking why foreign fIrms decided to invest in Taiwan in 1987, Chen
(1992:400) found "expansion of markets" to be the most cited reason.
How to measure market size is a somewhat difficult question. One
possibility is to use population. The more people there are who live in a country, the more
possible consumers. This measure, however, may be problematic because consumers
cannot buy products if they do not have money. Consider India, for example, which has
an extremely large population but a relatively small economy.
Another possible measure of market size is Real GDP per capita which has
been used by Lucas (1993:396) and Lim (1983:207-209). Clearly, the more people earn,
the more they have to spend and the larger the potential market. At first glance, GDP per
capita may seem a better measure than population. But it can be argued that population
size is still important because if two countries with equal GDP per capita have drastically
different population sizes, market seeking fIrms will be more likely to invest in the country
with a larger population.
Another reason why Real GDP per capita is not a perfect measure of
market size is that is does not account for savings rates, nor how evenly income is
distributed throughout a country. Because Real GDP per capita is merely an average
93Lizondo, 1991:80.
940ne fortunate result of lagging all of the explanatory variables is that this overcomes the potential
problem of simultaneity that would otherwise exist among some of the explanatory variables with the
independent variable (per capita FDI).
95Coughlin, Terza & Arromdee, 1991; Dobosiewicz, 1992:62; Gabrisch, 1993:24; Hamilton $ Adjubei,
1991:73; Hunya, 1992:508; Lizondo, 1991:70; Lucas, RobertE. B., 1993; Michalak, 1993:1576; Moore,
1993; Norman & Motta, 1995:483; de Souza & Stutz, 1994:534; Tsai, 1994; Welfens, 1994b:53.
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(Real GDP/Population) it remains possible that all of the GDP is concentrated in one small
sector of the population while the rest of the country has very little disposable income.
Therefore, both population and Real GDP per capita are included in the
model, for neither is a perfect measure of domestic market size. Both Lim and Lucas
found the coefficient of GDP per capita to be positive and statistically significant - as will
be the expectation in this model.
Edwards (1990) and Sader (1995:26)96 used GDP per capita in their
models as a proxy for the return on capital and expected a negative coefficient. They
believed that a lower per capita income signifies lower factor costs and would be
negatively associated with FDI. Both found the coefficient of GDP per capita to be
negative, but insignificant. Edwards concluded that per capita income is not a good
enough proxy for profitability because investors will also be attracted to large market size,
which allows investors to gain profits from sales within the country rather than producing
at a low cost for export only. 97 The model used in this paper will account for factor costs
(including labor costs, labor productivity and the openness of an economy) with other
measures that will be discussed later.
One should keep in mind that it is possible that higher profits (via selling to
more markets) may not necessarily be the chief objective of an investing frrm and that
mere enterprise growth, prestige or various indirect forms of profit may be the basic
consideration. 98 One hypothesis found in the literature is that FDI is merely the result of
capital flowing from countries with low rates of return to countries with high rates of
return but the existence of many countries experiencing large inflows and outflows of FDI
simultaneously is not consistent with this notion. 99 On the contrary, portfolio

diversification theory, 100 also refereed to as internalization theory, 101 states that rather
than merely seeking to maximize profits investors also try to reduce total risk by
distributing their direct investments among various countries. It is possible that
corporations with a wider international dispersion of their productive activities have
smaller fluctuations in their global profits if the returns on activities in different countries
are likely to have less than perfect correlation. This theory views foreign direct investment
as international portfolio diversification at the corporate level. Lizondo (1991:69) notes,
however, that support for portfolio diversification theory is extremely weak.
96Sader was merely replicating Edwards model with different data.
97Sader, 1995:28.
98Dobosiewicz, 1992:65; Froot, 1994:293; Lang & Ofek, 1993:1.
99Lizondo, 1991:68.
100Argawal, Gubitz & Nunnenkamp, 1991:7; Lizondo, 1991:69.
101Lang & Ofek, 1993:1.
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Market Growth
The rate at which an economy is growing is very much related to the
country's market size. Growth is measured by the annual percentage change in Real GDP.
As market seekers, investors are also interested in markets that are growing rather than
contracting. 102103 The coefficient of GDP growth is expected to be positive. Studies by
Takahashi (1975) and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social
Development (1993) found the coefficient ofGDP growth to be positive and significant.
Openness
Assuming that most FDI is in the tradable sector, a host country's degree of
openness with respect to international trade should also be a relevant factor in the
investor's decision.104 The openness of an economy can be represented by the sum of real
imports and exports divided by population. The more open a country, the greater the
possibility of exporting FDI-produced goods105 and importing input factors from other
countries.
The coefficient of this openness measure is expected to be positive, for it
generally seems logical to expect that those countries that are more open to international
transactions would also tend to be more inviting of FDI. In his survey of investing firms
Chen (1992:400) found the openness of a country to be one of the main factors firms
consider when deciding where to locate investment projects. Various researchers have
found the coefficient of openness to be positive and statistically significant. 106
Some literature has argued that import barriers serve as an incentive for
FDI because the latter is a medium to jump over protectionist fences. Supportive
evidence of import substitution has not been found, however. In a study of German FDI it
was found that import barriers in host countries affected German FDI negativ~ly .107 The
same study also found that German FDI did not have a significant influence on imports in
the host countries, i.e., neither a growth or a substitution effect.

102Lizondo, 1991:70; Tsai, 1994.
103The possibility of GDP growth and FDI being determined simultaneously will be avoided because
GDP growth, like most of the explanatory variables, will be lagged by one year. The reasoning behind
l(¥ling variables ~ill be explained more fu~ly i~ a later secti~n. .
..
.
Edwards, 1990, Norman & Motta, 1995.452, Sader, 1995.27, Welfens, 1994b.52-3, U.N., 1993.105.
105Inotao, 1991:100; Lucas, 1993.
106Argawal, Gubitz, Nunnenkamp, 1991:ix; Sader, 1995:28.
107Argawal, Gubitz, Nunnenkamp, 1991:12.
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It is also worth noting that, among industrialized countries, FDI is

typically followed by trade. lOS It seems fair to expect that this pattern would also hold
true for developing countries.
Government Size
The government's size relative to domestic economic activity is used as a
proxy for each country's stance toward private initiative. This will be measured by
G/GDP, where G is government consumption. It is assumed that countries whose
governments dominate their economy have greater bureaucracies with more stringent rules
over economic activity, resulting in more obstacles for foreign investors to abide by. For
this reason a negative coefficient is expected.
It may be the case that this method of measuring the extent to which

governments encourage private initiative is not very meaningful, for there is also an
argument which supports the expectation of a positive coefficient. One could reason that
a country with high Government spending is interested in promoting development by
investing in areas such as health, education, or infrastructure (e.g., transportation and
communications systems). Unfortunately, more there is no breakdown of data which
specifies how government consumption is being spent.
Both Sader (1995:28) and Edwards (1990) expected and found the
coefficient on government size to be negative and statistically significant. Because there is
uncertainty regarding the expected direction of the coefficient on government size it will
be an interesting variable to evaluate.
Gross Domestic Investment
A very good indicator of the general investment climate in a country is the
level of Gross domestic investment, per capita. High returns of foreign direct investments
will be ensured only if enough investment in the infrastructure has been realized firSt. 109
Gross domestic investment can also be perceived as the amount of domestic output that a
country invests in its people. 110 Given that domestic and foreign investments are
complementary, the coefficient should be positive - an expectation which indeed has been
found to hold true in past research. I I I

108Ibid.
109S arcinelli, 1992: 15.
llOUNCTAD, U.N., 1993:105.
lllArgawal, Gubitz, Nunnenkamp, 1991:ix; Sader, 1995:27-8.
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Labor Cost
Variables representing factor costs, including the cost of labor, should also
be included in the model, considering that the bulk of FDI occurs in the manufacturing
sector. Since the 1970s the most common measure for the cost of labor is the average
wage level. Many researchers have expected foreign investors to be drawn toward
countries with low average wage levels but the relative importance of labor costs for FDI
decisions is not as straightforward as it may initially appear. 1l2
In practice, investors prefer to pay the somewhat higher wage cost in the

most developed and favorably situated areas, these being offset by a better infrastructure
and the advantages of the presence of other industries. 113 Some of the most recent
sources believe that the significance of inter-country differentials in wage levels is
diminishing because FDI is becoming more and more capital intensive. 114 They contend
that the increasing robotization of production processes has generally reduced the
importance of low-skilled human labor and thus of low wage costs as an advantage of
location in a particular developing country. The result is that FDI will depend more on the
availability of high skill levels relevant to specific areas of production, design or
management. In short, comparing mere wage levels across countries is not practical if the
skill level of labor also differs greatly between countries.
Yet the cost of labor is still important. This paper introduces a new
method of measuring labor cost: average real monthly wages/average skilllevel. 115 This
measure of labor cost can be thought of as the average real price of a unit of labor skill.
The coefficient is expected to be negative, for foreign investors will be attracted to
countries labor forces that are both inexpensive and highly skilled.

Labor productivity
Though it is rational to equate inexpensive skilled labor as being more
productive labor, 116 there is a second measure that may better represent the productivity
of a country's labor force. Labor productivity can be indicated by real GDP/ the size of

the labor force. This can be understood as the average amount of Real GDP produced by
each worker. Both labor cost and labor productivity are included in the model because
labor productivity may resemble attributes of a work force that are unrelated to education,
112Argawal, Gubitz & Nunnenkamp, 1991:15.
113Dobosiewicz, 1992:35.
114Dobosiewicz, 1992:35; UNIDO, 1990:ix.
115The average skill level of a country is measured by the total percentage of the population which has
completed secondary education, attained from World Data 1994: World Bank Indicators on CD-ROM.
116Baldwin & Venables, 1994.
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such as work ethic and discipline and the strength of unions 117 - all of which might be a
function of how long a country has been living in a market system. I IS A positive
coefficient is expected because foreign investors are attracted to countries with more
productive labor forces. 119

Natural Capital
A country's supply of raw materials is also considered an important factor
in many FDI decisions I2o but there is a great deal of difficulty regarding how it can be
measured. Serageldin (1995) of the World Bank has recently constructed an index he calls
Natural Capital. I21 Though Serageldin admits himself that the index may not be a reliable
measure for various reasons, an attempt is made to include it in the model with a positive
coefficient expected.

External Debt
The viability of a country's banks can be indicated by the total external debt
stocks of the country, measured in real 1990 dollars. Foreign investors often seek shortterm and medium-term loans from domestic banks (in local currency) to finance business
operations and to relieve the pressures on entrepreneurs caused by unexpected production
fluctuations. This enables foreign firms to finance a larger amount of capital formation. I22
Firms entering developing countries require a substantial amount of resources from the
financial system, unlike those firms that are already well established. The further in debt a
country, the more difficult it is for investors to attain readily available funds at reasonable
interest rates. Furthermore, high indebtedness impairs the country's creditworthiness and
jeopardizes its external capital transactions. 123 The risk of willful default on external debt
may have its counterpart in the risk of expropriation and restrictions on profit and capital
remittances in the case of FDI.124

117Coughlin, Terza and Arromdee (1991) found unionization rates to be positively correlation with FDI
flows.
118Particularly since this study concerns former socialist countries.
119Hunya, 1992:509.
120Chen, 1992:400; Hamilton & Adjubei, 1991:87; Michalak, 1992:1584.
121Serageldin defines natural capital as "natural endowment... the stock of environmentally provided
assets (such as soil, atmosphere, forests, water, wetlands), which provide a flow of useful goods and
services." His measure was based on calculating four types of assets: land, water, forest, and subsoil
assets.
122Wai & Wong, 1982:20.
123Gabrisch, 1993:48; UNIDO, 1990:x; U.N., 1993:105.
124Argarwal, Gubitz & Nunnenkamp, 1991:18.
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No attempt was made to use the interest rates in these developing
countries, for they often do not reflect the scarcity of capital because capital markets are
either small or not well functioning. 125 Effective domestic costs of borrowing are
extraordinarily difficult to measure in almost all developing countries because of selective
credit policies and disequilibrium in institutional interest rates. 126 High indebtedness also
indicates the difficulty of repatriating earnings and capital due to limited access to foreign
exchange. 127 Therefore, the coefficient on external debt is expected to be negative.
Trend Variable
A trend variable was also added to capture the effects of the recent trends
of any FDI flows to developing countries between 1988 and 1992. It simply takes on the
value 1 for data points from 1988,2 for 1989, ... and 5 for 1992.
The Dependent Variable: Foreign Direct Investment. per capita
Foreign direct investment is comprised of all capital transactions that are
made to acquire a lasting interest in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that
of the investor, where the investor's purpose is to have an effective voice in the
management of the enterprise. Direct investment includes items such as equity capital,
reinvestment of earnings and other long- and short-term capital. 128
FDI includes only lasting interests because FDI implies control of a foreign
fIrm. 129,130

In this way FDI is differentiated from foreign portfolio investment. 131 The

assets involved in FDI are less liquid than those attained via portfolio investment; The
reversibility of FDI is more costly than the reversibility of portfolio investment.
Studies which have examined the determinants of FDI have weighted FDI
by either GDP or population. The model used in this study follows Edwards (1990) and
Sader (1995) by using per capita FDI as the independent variable for a couple of reasons.
First, this paper intends to explain how developing countries might better attract FDI, in
order to ultimately benefit the people of the country. Consider India which has a small
125Wai & Wong, 1982:18.
126pry, 1994.
127Ibid, p.130.
128World Data 1994: World Bank Indicators on CD-ROM. Washington, D.C.
129Sader, 1995:23.
130The FDI levels recorded by the IMP exclude transactions between affiliated banks and between other
affiliated financial intermediaries associated with deposits and other claims and liabilities related to usual
banking transactions, and similar claims and liabilities of other financial intermediaries. Put simply,
short-term financial flows between banking institutions are excluded. IMP, International Financial
Statistics, pp. xix.
131Lozondo,1991:80.
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economy and an enormous population. India does not wish to draw more FDI to merely
increase the ratio of FDI to GDP, but rather to gain from the benefits it provides for its the
people of India. From a mathematical standpoint it is possible for the ratio of FDI to GDP
to increase [or decrease] ifFDI flows remain constant and GDP decreases [or increases].
GDP may be a less reliable weight because the GDP of developing countries is more likely
to vary significantly form year to year. The aim of the model is not to examine what
affects the ratio ofFDI to GDP but rather what affects FDI levels alone. Using GDP as
the weight leaves open the possibility that the coefficients of the regressions will represent
how the explanatory variables affect GDP rather than FDI. This possibility is less likely to
occur with population.
The model is as follows, using the above explanatory variables:
FDI = f30 + ~lMKTi,'.1 + I1POP~I. 1 + ~3GROWi,t.I+~4G,t.1 + ~sGDIi,t.1
+ ~6LC.'.1 + J1LPi,t.1 + ~8NC + ~Xn,t.1 + ~loTREND + £i,1
MKT = market size
G = government size
LP = labor productivity
£ = error term

POP =population
GROW = market growth
GDI =gross domestic investment
LC =labor cost
NC =natural capital
XD =external debt

VIII. Missine explanatory variables
There are undoubtedly additional explanatory variables that might initially
be considered partial determinants ofFDI inflows to developing countries. Unfortunately,
reliable data on these variables ceases to exist, particularly for the countries of Eastern
Europe and many variables are unable to be measured easily and meaningfully.
Nonetheless, a discussion of those relevant variables which are not included in the model
is necessary so that interpretation of the regressions can be more accurate.

Government Incentives
For a number of decades incentives to foreign investors provided by host
countries were thought to help explain FDI but recent research has caste a great deal
doubt on their effectiveness. 132 Many developing countries have indeed attempted to
attract FDI by offering various fiscal incentives - most often tax concessions on operation
costs or profits or tariff exemptions but the literature has suggested that many developing
132Argawal, Gubitz & Nunnenkamp, 1991:128; Balasubramanyam, 1984:722; Gabrisch, 1993:25;
Inotao, 1991:102-3; Lim, 1983:211; Lizondo, 1991:78; Lim, 1982: 210; UNIDO, 1990:x.

19

countries offer tax concessions or other fiscal incentives to compensate for their low
resource endowments and labor skills, and to offset other disadvantages and risks inherent
in investing in their countries. Several studies based on interviews with managers and of
foreign firms as well as studies that have attempted to construct measures of fiscal
incentives have found fiscal incentives to be insignificant.
It has even been suggested that the implementation of fiscal incentives by
governments of developing countries could even backfire. 133 They may result in a vicious
circle if privileges granted to foreign investors give rise to hostile feelings against FDI in
the recipient countries. The consequences may be a new wave of regulations, intensified
efforts to circumvent the restrictions, and finally the retreat of foreign investors.
It appears more promising for developing countries which wish to attract
FDI to adhere to the rule that what is good policy for domestic investors is also good
policy for foreign investors. In other words, there is little need for the host developing
countries to focus on narrowly defined promotion measures to attract FDI. One matter
that such countries should consider is that the approval procedure that decides whether
foreign enterprises may invest should be as fast and transparent as possible, for it is a
crucial element in the FDI decision. Because of the wide-spread doubts regarding the
effectiveness of government incentives along with the difficulty of measuring them, no
attempt was made to construct a measure for the model in this study.

Infrastructure
One significant but difficult-to-measure determinant ofFDI is the quality of
a country's infrastructure. 134 A number of areas fall into this category, including the
transportation facilities within a country, the telecommunications systems available, the
quality of schools and even the efficiency of the legal system. Simply stated, infrastructure
is the level of technology that exists in a country. Single measures of infrastructure quality
are difficult to generate but many components are linked to other explanatory variables in
the model. A high quality of infrastructure facilities will be reflected in labor productivity,
labor cost (the cost of a unit of labor skill), the level of gross domestic investment and
even GDP per capita. The inclusion of these measures prevents the absence of a single
infrastructure variable from severely hurting the model's explanatory power.

Real Exchange Rates

133Argawal, Gubitz & Nunnenkamp, 1991:128.
134Sader, 1995:26; UNIDO, 1990:ix.
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Many researchers argue that movements in real exchange rates help
determine FDI.135 A depreciation of the domestic currency (in real terms) is expected to
boost FDI inflows by allowing foreign investors to acquire domestic assets more
cheaply. 136
A very recent model that included the real exchange rate was used by
Sader (1995:29) with a sample consisting of developing countries both within and outside
of Eastern Europe. Sader termed the real exchange rate as a measure of a country's
economic competitiveness. His results showed the coefficient of the real exchange rate
(measured in domestic currency per US dollar) to be positive but insignificant. Agarwal,
Gubitz & Nunnenkamp (1991:14) provide a good review of other research which has
examined how exchange rates effect FDI flows. While many studies have shown that
devaluation of the local currency encourages the inflow of FDI, other studies have shown
that the opposite effect of devaluation on FDI is also possible.
Unfortunately, reliable data for the real market exchange rate was unable to
be attained, particularly for the countries of Eastern Europe. Thus, the inability to include
the real market exchange rate in the model will weaken the model's explanatory power to
some degree.

Exchange Rate Volatility
The lack of applicable data also prevented the inclusion of exchange rate

volatility in the model. The volatility of the exchange rate could be indicated by the
variance of the exchange rate. Some economists believe this volatility would reflect
uncertainty that would hamper FDI inflows.137 Others argue that this volatility might be
positively correlated with FDI inflows.138 The argument is that because trade is negatively
affected by exchange rate volatility and many firms may be encouraged to substitute trade
with FDI in order to bypass the foreign exchange market, exchange rate volatility may
encourage FDI inflows. The variation of the market exchange rate goes unrecorded for
most developing countries.

Political Instability
Political instability has been found by a majority of survey reports as
discouraging for foreign investors. 139 The fear is that large and unexpected modifications
135Harvey, 1990; Lizondo, 1991:74; Rivera-Batiz & Rivera-Batiz, 1994:234.
136Froot & Stein, 1991; Sader, 1995:27; UN, 1993:105; Welfens, 1994b:147.
137Harvey, 1990; UN, 1993:105.
138Agarwal, Gubitz & Nunnenkamp, 1991:14-5.
139Agarwal, Gubitz & Nunnenkamp, 1991:17; Lizondo, 1991:77; Lucas, 1993; UNIDO, 1990:x.
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of the legal and fiscal frameworks may drastically change the economic outcome of a
given investment. 140 As a concept political risk embodies a variety of concerns, ranging
from production disruption, to confiscation or damage to property, to threats to
personnel, to changes in the macroeconomics environment or the regulatory
environment. 141
But econometric studies based on cross country data have produced only
142
mixed results.
Some researchers have found a negative association between FDI and
political instability but others have not been able to find out any such relation between the
two variables.
The mixed results may reflect a variety of factors. 143 Measuring political
instability is difficult,144 in part, because a given political event may give rise to different
levels of risk depending on the country of origin of the investment or the type of industry
in which the investment was made. Though no attempted measure of political instability
was included in the model, the political circumstances of every country in the sample must
not be totally ignored.
Privatization
Privatization has been one of the driving forces underlying the rapid
increase in FDI in developing countries in recent years, especially in Eastern Europe. 145
Privatization attract FDI directly by the sale of assets to foreigners, and indirectly by
attracting further investments from these buyers as well as by attracting completely new
investors. 146 A country's strong effort to privatize suggests that it has become more open
to private entrepreneurship and that the government is more willing to accept and support
private economic activity. Thus, foreign investors can expect an improved regulatory
environment. Investors can also expect an improvement in the general profitability of
investment projects because market distortions have been reduced through the transfer of
inefficiently run state-owned enterprises to the competitive private sector.
It is unfortunate that reliable data on privatization activity is yet to be
recorded. The little data that exists for Eastern Europe is especially weak because it

14Or.izondo, 1991:77.
141Lucas, 1993:395.
142Agarwal, Gubitz & Nunnenkarnp, 1991:17; Lizondo, 1991:77.
143These factors are summarized best by Liwndo, 1991:7.
144Lucas, 1993:395.
145Levcik, 1991:23; Sader, 1995:vi; Welfens, 1994b:160.
146Sader, 1995.
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excludes all voucher privatization which is the method of privatization employed by
Eastern European countries the most.1 47
Even if data on voucher privatization were available the outcome of
voucher privatization would be uncertain for it is not clear whether investment funds
acting as intermediaries will confine themselves just to administrative functions and the
improvement of their portfolios, or whether they will actually exercise ownership rights in
joint stock companies whose shares they hold. 148 In this sense, voucher privatization is
superficial and of limited effectiveness regarding improvements in efficiency. It may
moreover lead to the destruction of considerable amounts of equity and to illicit
enrichment by insiders and thus discredit privatization in the eyes of the general public.
Some of the effects of privatization levels may be captured in government

size and even labor productivity because an increase in privatization is associated with a
reduction in the role of a government in its economy.
Econometrically speaking, the exclusion of a relevant variable is not a
problem so long as it is not correlated with any of the explanatory variables that are
included in the model. If they the excluded relevant variable is correlated with one of the
included explanatory variables the coefficient of the included variable will have some bias.
Because this study is not concerned so much with developing a model that can predict FDI
flows, bias coefficients are not of major concern. The interest of this paper is simply to
determine which variables are relevant in explaining FDI.
VIII. Re&ression Analysis and Interpretation
Two separate regression were run using the model built in Section VI.
First a regression was run for a set of non-Eastern-European developing countries during
the years 1988 and 1992. 149 Another regression was run for a set of Eastern European
countries over the same years. ISO All of the explanatory variables are lagged by one year.

147Ibid, 19.
148Levcik,1991:24.
149This data set consisted of 154 observations from the following 31 countries for the years 1988 through
1992 for which data was available: Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote
d'Ivorie, Egypt, Ghana, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,
Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey,
Venezuela and Zambia.
150This data set consisted of 39 observations from the following 16 countries for those years between
1988 and 1992 for which there was available data: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (Czech and Slovak
Republics after 1991, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland,
Romania, Slovenia, Russian Federation, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
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A Model for non Eastern European Developing Countries
The results of the regression run for non Eastern European developing
countries is presented below with a summary of descriptive statistics.
Table D.
Regression output for non Eastern European countries.
Coefficient Standard t-statistic
Error
-0.356
Intercept
- 3.200
8.986
1.148(m)
MKT
0.011
0.013
11.990
0.786
GROW
9.422
9.835***
0.004
OPEN
0.038
0.387(m)
GDI
0.008
0.022
-1. 059 (m)
LP
-0.003
0 . 003
-1.313 *
LC
-2.283
1. 738
-12.838
60.235
-0.213
G
-2.412***
-0.011
0.004
XD
0 . 153
NC
0.016
0.105
TREND
1. 628*
2.044
1.255
Adjusted R-squared: 0 . 797

F-statistic: 60 . 5

* significant at 10% confidence interval
** significant at 5% confidence interval
*** significant at 1% confidence interval
(m) becomes significant after multicollinear variables are dropped
TableE.
Summary of Statistics for Non Eastern Europe Sample (Sample size: 153)
Mean
FDI
MKT
POP
GROW
OPEN
GDI
LP
LC
G
XD
NC
TREND

27.52
1,483.95
6.38E7
0.030
935
331.38
3,954
3.59
0.130
897.85
26.4
2.97

Minimum Maximum
St. Er. St. Dev. Variance Range
-5.64
2,201
270
264.49
3 . 79
46.91
6,530
78.69
112.47
1 , 391
6,609.0 3
1. 94E7
1 . 48E7
2.19E16 8.64E8 2.30E7
8.67E7
1. 19E7
1.43 -0.658
0.012
0.152
0.023
0.769
5,163
5,221
1,030
1.06E6
58
83
1,854
27.29
27 . 54
340.70
116,079
1,881.06
147
17,3 12
284
3,518
1.24E7 1. 72E4
7.47
0.04
7.51
0.10
1.29
1. 67
0.183
0.039
0.222
0.003
0.036
0.001
610.60
372,838 2.69E3
78 . 09
2,766.94
49.36
4.0
18.6
347.7
69.0
73.0
1.5
1.41
4
1
0 . 11
1. 99
5

Population was but dropped from the model because, when it was initially
included, its coefficient was extremely small at 0.0000000363 and had a very low tstatistic of 0.285. Dropping population caused an increase in the adjusted R-squared.
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With an F-statistic of 60.5 the regression as a whole is significant. The
model explains a high proportion ofFDI with an R-squared of 0.797. Yet only openness,
external debt, labor cost and trend are statistically significant. The t-statistics of market
size, market growth, gross domestic investment, government size and natural capital are
not significant but eliminating any of these variables would harm the explanatory power of
the model.
The coefficients of all the variables are of the expected direction, except for
labor productivity. The negative sign on the coefficient for labor productivity is certainly
the result of multicollinearity. 151 Labor productivity is correlated with both market size
and gross domestic investment. The sign on the coefficient for labor productivity
becomes positive if market size is dropped from the model and, if gross domestic
investment is also dropped from the model, labor productivity becomes statistically
significant at the 5% confidence level (t-stat.=1.74).
Similarly, market size becomes statistically significant at the 5% confidence
level (t-stat.=2.13) when both labor productivity and gross domestic investment are
dropped from the model; and gross domestic investment becomes statistically significant at
the 5% level (t-stat.=2.21) when both market size and labor productivity are dropped
from the model. In short, each of these three variables are significant determinants of FDI
but their variances are rather high when all three are included in the model at the same
time because of their multicollinearity. It is not possible, however, to state the magnitudes
in which each of these three determinants explain FDI.
The variables growth, government size, and natural capital are kept in the
model, despite having insignificant t-statistics because dropping all three from the model
does not cause a change in the R-squared value or adjusted R-squared value. This implies
that these three variables may still be relevant in explaining FDI.
A Model for Eastern Europe
The results of the regression run for the developing countries of Eastern
Europe is presented on the following page with a summary of descriptive statistics.

151This is obvious because when labor productivity is regressed on FDI alone, its coefficient is positive
and strongly significant.
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Table F.
Regression output for Eastern Europe.
Coefficients Standard t-statistic
Error
Intercept
-3.53
65.17
-0.054
MKT
-0.01
-0.763
0.01
GROW
-82.95
115.92
-0.716
OPEN
0.03
1. 433
0.02
GDI
0 . 04
0.11
0.363
LP
-0 . 02
-1 . 205
0.02
LC
-3.48
-0.9822
3.54
G
0.78
0.003
305.80
XD
0.04
1.288
0.03
NC
-0.09
1.15
-0.075
TREND
9.89
10.97
0.902
Adjusted R-squared: 0 .072

F-statistic: 1 . 29

TableG.
Summary of Statistics for Eastern Europe Sample (Sample size: 39)
Mean
FDI
MKT
POP
GROW
OPEN
GDI
LP
LC
G
XD
NC
TREND

29.58
2,848.21
2.12E7
-0.075
1,857.08
704.07
4,615.09
4.54
0.127
1,180.28
20.0
3.74

St. Er. St.Dev. Variance
Range
Minimum Maximum
11.01
4,731
68.79
362
0
361. 52
287
1,793 3,216,312
8,284 379.42 8,663.40
5.23E6 3.27E7
1.07E15 1. 47E8 1.57E6
1.49E8
0.019
0.118
0.0138
0.498 -0.302
0.196
5,310 365.83
176
1100
1. 21E6
5676.00
45.42 283.64
80,451
1,400
61.41 1,461.70
225
1,403 1,969,007
6,792 743.93
7535.44
1. 088
6.797
46.2
38.41 0.0013
38 . 41
0.008
0.048
0.002
0.191
0.036
0.227
77
231,293
2,051
481
50.58 2,101.11
2 ..275 14.208
202
66
4
70
0.216
1.352
1.8273
4
1
5

As was done with the previous regression, population was dropped from
the model because its coefficient was extremely small at -0.0000000032 and its t-statistic
was very low at -0.00386. Dropping population again caused an increase in the adjusted
R-squared value.
The F-statistic of 1.29 signifies that the regression as a whole is
insignificant. This is not surprising, considering that none of the explanatory variables are
statistically significant - not even at the 10% significance leveL Attempts were made at
dropping some variables from the model to see if the significance of any of respective

26

correlated variables would change but no such case was found. Thus, multicollinearity
does not seem to be the reason why none of the variables are statistically significant. 152
The results of the regression on Eastern Europe imply that the model
ceases to explain FDI flows between 1988 and 1992 in this region of the world. The next
section will discuss possible reasons why the determinants of FDI to non Eastern
European developing countries do not also explain FDI flows in Eastern Europe.

IX. Conclusions. Implications and Recommendations for Future Research
From the two regressions presented above it appears that models which
typically explain FDI flows to developing countries very well, fail to explain FDI flows to
Eastern Europe for the years 1988-1992. The explanation of FDI in Eastern Europe is
certainly complicated by a set of unique political and economic circumstances
characterizing this region after the collapse of the centrally planned model of industrial
development. 153
One partial explanation for the recent acceleration for FDI into Eastern
Europe is that the trend is simply a result of the economic transition that is taking place.
Before this time period, the closed borders of the communist governments prevented
foreign investors from even considering locating investment enterprises in Eastern Europe.
But since these restrictions have fallen along with the communist governments themselves,
investors have indeed considered Eastern Europe a viable region to locate investment. 154
How then were the large inflows of FDI able to occur despite the
unexpected coefficients on so many of the determinants? It is plausible that the
coefficients of market size, market growth, government size, external debt and natural
capital were of opposite sign than expected (and opposite from the respective signs
produced by the non Eastern Europe regression) because the accelerating inflow of FDI
has coincided with deepening economic depression. The dramatic events which have
taken place in Eastern Europe during the last eight years have resulted in both economic
depression and opening doors to FDI. In other words, the particular situation of the
transitional countries of Eastern Europe (which is not fully captured by the variables in the
model) provides the predominarit explanation of increasing FDI inflows to that region.
It may also be the case that privatization levels have been the main

determinant of FDI inflows to Eastern Europe. It is thus encouraged that future studies
152Multicollinearity is normally thought to be present when the regression as a whole is significant but
each individual explanatory variables are not which is not the case in this situation anyway.
153Michalak,1992:1575.
154This trend is somewhat exemplified by the positive coefficient of openness.
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attempt to develop data to represent the privatization levels in the sample and test their
importance in determining FDI flows to transitional countries.
Also, the approach of this study is one-sided because it ignores the
structure of the supply side of FDI - where FDI is coming from.I55 Knowing which parts
of the world are supplying FDI to which parts of the world may reveal interesting trends.
Many researchers have found that international investment decisions are increasingly
inclined to favor locations that are closer in direct proximity to a firm's home country.1 56
Such is the case in Eastern Europe. Parents of almost 70% of Eastern Europe's foreign
investment originates from the countries of Western Europe,157,158 especially
Germany.I59,160 Japan, the largest contributor ofFDI in the world, is almost completely
absent in Eastern Europe. 161,162 The proportion of capital being contributed by the United
States is small (approximately 9%) but steadily increasing. I63 Clearly, the degree of
familiarity with the host economy by the foreign investors significantly affects their
location choices,l64 whether in terms of language, culture, legal systems, technical
standards, customer preferences or the general economic situation. 165
Even if the short-run returns gained by Western European investors in
Eastern Europe are relatively low in comparison to expected returns of investment in other
developing regions, there may be intangible (or long term) benefits from investing in
Eastern Europe. Understandably, Western Europe has a vested interest in promoting
stability and development on its Eastern flank. 166 Failure to do so raises the likelihood of
vastly increased labor migration to the West, as well as the likelihood of political instability
that could be very threatening to national security.1 67
The main barrier to better understanding the supply side of FDI is the lack
of pertinent data. There are no official data sources that entail a breakdown of the
155Agarwal, Gubitz & Nunnenkamp, 1991:6.
156Gabrisch, 1993:24; Moore, 1993; UNIDO, 1990:vi.
157Damrau, 1992:33; Hamilton & Adjubei, 1991:79; Michalak, 1992:1581; Sader, 1995:18; Welfens,
1994b:165.
158The Vesigrad Countries (Hungary, Poland, and the Czecha and Slovak Republics) which border
Western Europe are receiving a higher proportion of all FDI flowing into Eastern Europe.
159Dobosiewicz, 1992:92; Fink, 1993:14; Hunya, 1992:508; Norman & Motta, 1995:484.
160And the largest investor in Hungary is Austria. Michalak, 1992:1587.
161Dobosiewicz, 1992:91; Michalak, 1992:1582; Welfens, 1994a:50; Welfens, 1994b:141.
162Asia is the region supplied mostly by FDI flowing out of Japan. Dobosiewicz, 1992:91;Michalak,
1992:158.
163Dobosiewicz, 1992:97; Hamilton & Adjubei, 1991:81.
164Michalak, 1992:1575.
165Damrau, 1992:39; Lizondo, 1991:71.
166Michalak, 1992:1588.
167Dobosiewicz, 1992:118; Levcik, 1991:27.

28

sources from which FDI is flowing. Part of the reason is that it is not clear how
investment from multi-national corporations should be recorded. Another is that more and
more small firms are entering global agreements and their transactions go unrecorded.
Nonetheless, when conducting research regarding FDI flows, it is important to at least
keep the supply side issues of FDI in mind.
A major implication of the both the regression results and the issues of
supply-side FDI is that regional differences must be taken into account when attempting to
empirically assess the determinants of FDI flows. The recent history and political context
of one region (or even of a particular country) may override all other factors that are
normally thought to explain FDI. Certain regional differences may be strong enough to
warrant that attempts to develop FDI models examine various regions separately. The
results from regional studies would better enable governments to make more accurate and
effective policy decisions.
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(1994) National Account Statistics 1992. New York.
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